First of all, let's give him a clap, shall we? After a mere 50 posts or thereabouts, we finally managed to beat 
an actual counter-argument out of him. Congratulations, Ball, I knew you had it in you.

Now, let's go about setting him straight.

Ball contends two things:

(1) There is a prevailing wisdom, both among the general public and among the majority of professional 
philosophers, that species *in itself* is morally relevant. Not the various differences in cognition which are 
correlated with differences in species membership, no, no-one thinks that's the issue. Everyone, the general 
public and the majority of moral philosophers alike, believes that species in itself is where the action is, and 
when talking about cognition I was merely engaging in a "350-word passing of gas" attacking a straw person. 
(2) The burden of proof is on those who would deny that species membership in itself is a morally relevant 
difference. No-one who contends that species membership in itself in itself has the slightest obligation to 
defend their position until a satisfactory challenge has been mounted. It's the people who would deny that 
species membership is morally relevant who have to make their case. Those who advocate radical reform in our 
treatment of nonhuman animals always shirk this obligation, and Ball knows this as a "master of logic and 
philosophy", so he's entitled to have the utmost contempt for anyone who advocates radical reform in our 
treatment of nonhuman animals and regard himself as an intellectually superior person who is "kicking their ass".

He is wrong on both points. 

Let's start with (1). Most people haven't given much thought to the subject of why we generally accord nonhuman 
animals a much lower moral status than all humans. It doesn't occur to them to question it. But hardly anyone, 
when asked to offer some thoughts about the subject, is going to say "It's just because we're members of the 
species Homo sapiens, no other reason". They're going to say something along the lines of "Well, obviously there 
are all sorts of big differences between humans and nonhumans, the explanation must be something to do with that". 
That's what almost all moral philosophers who have written about the issue think as well. Hardly anyone thinks 
that defending the contention that species *in itself* is what matters is a promising prospect. Just about 
everyone who has written about the issue, regardless of where they stand on the issue of how nonhuman animals 
should be treated, is perfectly happy to concede "Sure, species as such does not matter". Sure, there are some 
exceptions, such as Carl Cohen. Carl Cohen says "No, actually, I think I can make a case that species in itself is 
a morally relevant difference". But he acknowledges an obligation to argue the point, because he's a serious 
thinker, not some loser who spends half his life hurling childish insults at people on Internet discussion 
boards and cherishing the delusion that he's demonstrating some sort of intellectual superiority.

The contention that species in itself matters is not a prevailing orthodoxy among the public or among moral 
philosophers. It's a minority view. It might be right. But it's got to be argued, on which more below.

Time to look at (2).

Let's try this out with a few other examples.

First Mother: Would you please stop upsetting my baby? I mean, you wouldn't think it was okay for me to upset your 
baby, would you? What's the difference?
Second Mother: Well, my baby has brown hair, you see.
First Mother: Er, excuse me, but I'm afraid I fail to see the moral relevance of the difference between our 
babies' hair colour.
Second Mother: Well, I'm sorry to hear that, but I'm afraid it's not my job to argue the point. You're the 
claimant, the burden of proof is on you. You haven't met your intellectual obligation to show that there's no 
morally relevant difference between you upsetting my baby and me upsetting your baby. So I'm afraid you have to 
concede that as things stand you haven't given me any good reason not to upset your baby.

19th century abolitionist: You know, I really don't think it's right for you to hold black people as slaves. I 
mean, you wouldn't think it was all right to hold white people as slaves, would you? What's the difference?
Slaveholder: Well, they've got black skin, you see. That's the difference.
19th century abolitionist: Surely you must be joking. I mean, I can see that there are some differences which are 
currently thought to be correlated with differences in skin colour which might by some stretch of the imagination 
be thought to be morally relevant. We could talk about that if that was your line. But skin colour all by 
itself? Surely you have to be kidding me. Surely you must acknowledge an obligation to tell me some story about 
why skin colour is relevant.
Slaveholder: Well, I'm sorry you feel that way, but I'm afraid I just don't have any such obligation. You're the 
claimant, the burden of proof is on you. One of the premises of your argument was that skin colour isn't a 
morally relevant difference, I reject that premise, now it's your job to defend the premise. Everyone else thinks 
it's all right to hold slaves, you're the challenger of the orthodoxy, the burden of proof is on you. If you can't 
defend that premise to my satisfaction I guess you'll have to leave me be.

Opponent of animal research: You know, I really think this research you do on mice is ethically questionable. I 
mean, you wouldn't think it was all right to do it on cognitively impaired humans, would you? What's the 
difference?
Vivisector: Well, you see, cognitively impaired humans have two legs. Mice have four legs. That's the difference.
Opponent of animal research: Did I hear you correctly? What on earth does the number of legs have to do with it? 
You're going to have to do better than that. Tell me why you think the number of legs is morally relevant.
Vivisector: Look, I've given you an answer to your argument, I've told you which premise I reject. You're the 
claimant, the burden of proof is on you. Everyone else thinks it's all right to vivisect mice, you're the 
challenger of the orthodoxy, the burden of proof is on you. It's your job to tell me why the number of legs isn't 
morally relevant. I've discharged my obligation of answering your argument. If you've got nothing further to say, 
I'll get back to cutting up this mouse.

Well, I'm very sorry, Ball, but I'm afraid it doesn't work like that.

When I'm defending my third premise I don't have to answer every conceivable objection that might be made to it. 
That would not be possible. I only have to answer those objections that have some prima facie plausibility. If 
someone wants to raise an objection which most people agree lacks prima facie plausibility, that's fine, but 
they've got an obligation to argue the point. If Carl Cohen or you want to go out on a limb and argue that 
species difference all by itself, not the other things generally associated with it, is morally relevant, that's 
fine. But it's your job to argue the point. All serious contributors to the debate agree with me on this one.

There is a reason why I did not address Cohen's argument in that talk. I was not addressing a philosophy 
conference. I had limited time and was addressing an audience with limited experience of philosophy. It would not 
have been feasible or helpful to my cause to go into detail about every argument in the literature. My task was to 
tell them within the space of about 45 minutes why some philosophers think that the harmful use of nonhuman 
animals in scientific research is morally wrong. I'm quite happy with my performance on that task. I have never 
suggested that this talk is a comprehensive survey of all the arguments in the literature. I said it was a good 
start by way of defending equal consideration for nonhuman animals that deserved some sort of reply. It took us a 
long time to beat a decent reply out of you.

If you want to talk about Cohen's work, either quoting it or paraphrasing it in your own words, or you want to 
make your own argument, that's great. But you have an obligation to make some kind of argument. Endlessly 
babbling "You're begging the question" is not good enough. Uttering the single word "kind" is not good enough. 
You have to tell us a coherent story about *why* species difference, all by itself, is morally relevant. Then we 
shall see how well you fare.

*That* is your intellectual obligation, Ball. You're proud of being someone who doesn't shirk their intellectual 
obligations. The ball is in your court. Get busy.